By Fr. Nicholas Afanasiev
When life in ecclesial communities flows
on without significant interruptions within or without, in forms familiar to
the church consciousness, particularly when there is no recollection of any
noticeable or significant changes, then the broad masses within the Church are
inclined to think that the existing forms are stable and inviolate. The usual
canonical consciousness in those epochs emanates out of the very forms of
Church life, i.e. everything which reflects those forms is considered canonical
and everything which deviates is seen as a violation of the canons themselves.
The basis of such conviction lies in the unshakable confidence that the Church
structure sanctified by centuries cannot but rest upon canons and be regulated
by them. The undisputed worthiness of such canonical consciousness is in the
conclusion that if it does not resolve all canonical problems it, in any case,
does away with them.
The obvious canonical problems are not confronted because the conflict between the canons and the life of the Church remains obscure. On the other hand such a blissful existence comes to an end when the smooth and calm flow of Church life is violated and when the very forms of Church life begin to change. All disruption, all change in the life of the Church, especially the evolution of new forms, demand a canonical evaluation. The usual canonical consciousness is helpless before such an evaluation since it itself has been shaken and has lost its firm foundation which it had under earlier forms. In such changing times a certain change takes place in the very foundation of canonical consciousness: canons are acknowledged as the foundation and the highest criteria as the means for the solution of canonical problems and in the evaluation of the old and the newly-evolving forms of Church life. The accepted formula: "that which corresponds to centuries-old forms of Church life is canonical," is replaced by: "that which corresponds to the canons, is canonical." The new formula demands a much more attentive study and a familiarity with canonical material than in the past. Incidentally, a close familiarity with the material shows that in this area, not everything is so simple as one may wish. It becomes evident that canons can not always be the final criteria and they themselves demand a more higher criterion. As a result not only is there an inability of the usual canonical consciousness to deal with canonical problems but there is a total uncertainty in the consciousness itself.
This uncertainty in the canonical
consciousness is one reason for the many difficulties in current Church life.
In time, of course, these difficulties will be overcome especially if the
conditions of our life change as a result not only of purely Church matters but
by other things, having no relation to the Church. On the other hand it seems
to me that in whatever way we can assist towards a beneficial process of time,
we can prepare for the overcoming of these difficulties by establishing a
correct basis of canonical consciousness and a correct relationship to canons
based on that consciousness.
* * *
In order to solve
canonical problems a knowledge of canonical material is insufficient in itself,
nor is the ability for applying this knowledge by referring to this or that
canon in specific cases. One must know the meaning of "canonical" and
"uncanonical," i.e. there must be a broader and a higher criterion
which would be superior to individual canonical problems and by which the
canons themselves and the external forms of Church life could be judged. This
criterion can be manifest only under correct canonical consciousness, i.e. one
which comes out not from temporary, changeable things, but out of things which
are changeless, permanent, supratemporal, and eternal. In this way the question
of correct canonical consciousness comes to the foundation upon which this
consciousness must rest.
Is it
possible to seek a foundation for the correct canonical consciousness exclusively from the forms of Church life
developed through history, as the usual canonical consciousness is inclined to
do? In other words, can the forms of Church life which evolved be considered
unchangeable? This question can be rephrased in another way: are the
historically evolved forms of Church life the only possible ones? Is it not
possible, in an extreme case, to imagine other forms of Church life, as a
result of other historical circumstances that the ones presently existing? If
we turn to history then it seems that the answer can be in the affirmative. In
reality, historical possibilities were diverse; the historical development
could have gone in different directions and Church life did not always reflect
that which was the basis of the first Christian communities, but was subject to
substantial changes from those beginnings and an introduction of new ones. To
see this, it is enough to compare the charismatic structure of Christian
communities in the First century not only with our Church life, but with the
structure of the Church in the Fourth and Fifth centuries, or the Church
structure in the Second century with its small communities independent of each
other, with the Church order during the formation of Patriarchal territories
or, finally, the form of the Alexandrian Church of the Third century with the
form found in its nearest neighbors: Antioch, Jerusalem and Ephesus. Even
during the times when the basic foundations of Church organization saw their
final development, one can find a number of examples of radical changes: the composition
of councils in pre-Constantinian times and in later periods; the delineation of
the bishop's authority, the significance of the lay element, etc. It would not
be correct to say that the Roman community of the First century contained
within itself all the attributes of future "Catholicism." As a result
of a number of other historical conditions, the history of the Western Church
could have had a different development: it could have been less divergent from
the Eastern Church in its structure, just as the Eastern Church could have
acquired more characteristics of "Catholicism." However, Church
structure is influenced not only by different forms of historical conditions --
ecclesial, political, social, cultural, but even something more, which does not
depend on these temporary, changeable influences. Canonical structure is only
the external expression of the dogmatic teaching about the Church. This
teaching is that changeless, timeless nucleus which lies, or must lie, as the
foundation of all Church structure. Out of the same kernel, depending on
different conditions, on differences in culture, grows the plant with different
external variations. But no matter how far these variations go, a particular
seed can only result in a particular growth. The canonical structure of the
Church can be different, and this difference is legitimate and even necessary,
as long as it does not impinge upon the changeless substance of the Church. In
different historical epochs the substance of the Church could have various
expressions inasmuch as it demands and looks for a more complete realization
under given historical circumstances. This is an essential condition for every
correct form of Church life -- to realize more fully the substance of the
Church itself within historical circumstances -- but at the same time this is
the boundary beyond which these changes can not go.
Thus it can be admitted that the historical
process of Church life could have gone a different way and that Church
structure could have adapted in different ways from what presently exists, but
under the conditions that these variations do not touch upon and distort the
substance of the Church. Protestantism was correct in its wishes to change the
structure of the Catholic Church of the Middle Ages, as something that did not
meet the needs of conditions of the new era (the Catholic Church very quickly
and substantially changed and thus recognized the correctness of those needs)
and which in some ways distorted the nature of the Church; but the Protestants
themselves fell into a total tyranny since they fell away from the dogmatical
teaching about the Church. Their Church structure did not have its nucleus, it
did not have its carrier, since it found itself outside the Church, thus the
changes which were allowed overstepped those bounds beyond which they became
distortions. Every form of Church life is legitimate and acceptable as long as
it is based on correct dogmatical teaching. Thus the Catholic structure would
not call for substantial changes from our part only if the differences in the
dogmatical teaching about the Church could be straightened out. On the other
hand it is quite understandable that the Catholic Church would be willing to
accept totally the structure of the Eastern Church only if Orthodoxy would accept
the teaching on Papal authority, i.e. the Catholic teaching about the Church.
The dogmatic teaching
about the Church, as all dogmas, is not only a theoretical truth: it must find
its reflection and realization in life. This realization of dogmatical teaching
about the Church is the canonical structure, but this realization of course,
can never be complete. No form of Church life adequately expresses the fullness
of the dogmatical teaching, and is only a relative approach to it under a given
historical situation. Thus there can be no talk about any absolutization of
whatever form of Church life, since such an absolutization would express the
introduction of relative empirical forms to the level of absolute truth.
However, on the other hand, historical forms are not completely incidental:
they are always a valid attempt to express more completely the nature of the
Church, or in any case, some of its aspects. Various historical forms,
internally, in their depth, are linked with each other in the foundations of
its dogmatic teaching. That is why any change must be in response not only to
the changing historical conditions and the need to adapt to them, but at the
same time, to the striving for a more complete, more adequate expression of the
nature of the Church under the new historical circumstances. All this means
that any such change becomes legitimate and justified when the new form of
Church life will give a more fuller expression of the eternal dogmatic truth
about the Church than did the older form. We are free to change and to create
historical forms of Church life but we are not always correct in doing so. In
this problem, as well as in Orthodoxy in general, we have a combination of
conservatism and loyalty to tradition with the greatest freedom and boldness.
Canonical consciousness
cannot have its basic strong point in historically evolved forms because of
their relativeness and impermanence. If it attempts to be dependent on them
then this will result in an incorrect relationship to historical forms and to a
distortion of the canonical consciousness itself. It is unavoidable that one of
such temporary forms of Church life is elevated to a permanent and unchangeable
status. This will bring about a weakness and even a loss of the critical
relationship to contemporary forms of life. A proper feeling for history
disappears or must disappear, and with it, any creative energy. The eternal
dynamic Church life is replaced by one that is static: an absolute
subordination to the relative. The general rule becomes effective under which
every attempt of absolute assertion of empirical relativism results in that
what is absolute, and truly unchangeable becomes relative. Canonical
consciousness becomes a brake which attempts to hold Church life in one place,
it stifles any new currents of life, not only the undesirable but even the
healthy. Of course it is possible to interfere and to oppose the historical
process, but history cannot be delayed or stopped. A different historical epoch
must naturally accept its form of Church life as the basis for canonical
consciousness. Consequently, there cannot be a single canonical consciousness
and every period has its own canonical consciousness, and thus there is no
single criterion but there are any number of them. The absence of a single
canonical consciousness tears the history of the Church apart and violates the
unity of the Church itself.
If one cannot find the
sources for correct canonical consciousness in historical manifestations of
Church life then perhaps it is possible to find them in the canons themselves,
in the ecclesiastical legislation, i.e. to consider canonical that which
corresponds to canons. I will not touch upon the very complex problem of the
interrelation of juridical consciousness and juridical norms but only wish to
point out one circumstance: in order that canonical consciousness can really
have a basis in canonical norms, it is essential that these norms encompass and
delineate all canonical life in the Church and all its order such as, for
example, Hebrew legislation which encompassed and regulated the total life of
the Hebrew people. Hebrew Old Testament juridical consciousness is the classic
and perhaps the only example of juridical consciousness completely conditioned
by existing norms. This was possible only because the Old Testament norms, at
least in the consciousness of the Hebrew people, were given once and for all
and had their source in the will of God. Incidentally, if we turn to canonical
legislation we will find extremely curious features. The Orthodox Church never
had and to this day does not have a common codex of Church law which could
compare to the codex of canon law of the Catholic Church. In this I do not in
any way suggest that the Orthodox Church must correct that deficiency. Each
local Church has its own compendium which reflects the local characteristics.
The source of all such compendia lie those collections of Church law compiled
in Medieval Byzantium. These contain decisions of Church authorities which were
reached in totally different historical epochs and in different Churches, as
well as decrees of Byzantine emperors and a number of statutes which are of
purely local character. The form in which these codices of local Church law
presently exist cannot fully serve as practical guides and are in reality only
of historical interest. Today's Church organization outgrew these codices. A
significant part of their norms cannot be applied to present conditions and
have been changed and even discarded in various autocephalous Churches. Along
with these codices the autocephalous Churches publish and continue to publish
their own canons either making up a part of local compilations or exist in
separate forms. Naturally there is neither external nor internal agreement
among all these norms which make up the Canon Law of each local Church.
In all
these laws of the local Churches a number of decrees can be extracted which apply to the whole Orthodox Church.
These are, in a narrow sense, canons based on decisions of Ecumenical Councils,
local Councils, and Church Fathers which were accepted by the whole Church.
These enactments were collected in a special compilation by the Russian Church
called Kniga Pravil [Book of Rules]. Even though the Church always treated
these with special respect they nonetheless were subject to changes, additions
and deletions from the time of their promulgation (approx. from IX to X
centuries) through later years. But only in extreme cases did the issue of new
decrees included directions about the discarding of the corresponding previous
canon. This presents one of the difficulties in the application of these canons
which has no analogous example in any other form of jurisprudence. At the
present time we can not always have the ability to determine which canons are
effective and which are not. Thus it is possible to state with certainty that
certain canons are no longer effective, for example all canons dealing with the
reception into the Church of individuals from ancient heresies which no longer
exist, such as Montanists, Novatians, Photinians, Arians, etc., and canons
governing institutions which disappeared from the Church such as penitential
discipline. It becomes more difficult to deal with canons no longer observed
which govern the age of clerics, forbidding the translation of presbyters and
bishops, the summoning of councils, courts, ecclesiastical penalties, etc.
Inasmuch as they are no longer observed, can they be ignored or should Church
life be changed to allow these canons to be effective once again?
It is obvious, in the
light of the state of ecclesiastical legislation described above, that the
agenda of a future Council must include the question of the codification of
canons. It is true that we have no definite indication as what this
codification can be. It is entirely possible that the model for the compilation
of the general rules for all Orthodox Churches which will be the Corpus Juris
Canonis for them, be the one issued recently by the Catholic Church. The
compilation of such a Codex is not likely to meet the present needs of the
Orthodox Church nor is it likely to become a reality. A general Orthodox
compilation of laws would be an innovation which would not reflect the spirit
of the Orthodox Church. A unification of canonical legislation assumes such a
state of uniformity in the canonical structures of Church life of Autocephalous
Churches which the Orthodox world does not know especially from the time of the
fall of Byzantium. External administrative uniformity of local Churches would
be foreign: this uniformity would be in contrast to the internal unity, the
unity of Spirit and Faith. A common compilation of rules would forcibly violate
the particularities of life of the local Churches and would do little to
contribute to their internal, spiritual oneness. But should a future council
attempt to create such a compilation it would be faced with such difficulties
which it would not be able to overcome. How would it be possible to find
agreement in and combine all existing differences in the legislation of local Churches
especially at this time when the separatism of individual local Churches has
reached a point unprecedented in the history of Orthodoxy? Finally, by what
means can such a compendium be made mandatory, since this would depend not only
upon the supreme Ecclesial authority but upon the civil authority in the
territories in which these Churches are found? One must hope only that what is
understood here is the codification of canons of past Ecumenical and Local
Councils which are recognized as obligatory and effective at the present time
and which are supplemented by those passed by a future Council.
This lack of complete
internal and external unity does not reflect on the one hand, the most
characteristic mark of canonical legislation. Such a mark is its incompleteness.
In reality, it completely lacks those norms which by analogy with juridical
legislation, can be referred to as "fundamental." The more complete
canonical compilations not only Eastern but Western as well, have no canons
which establish general and fundamental principles of Church organization.
These compilations have any number of canons regulating the relationship of
bishops among themselves, the interrelation of presbyters and deacons, but we
would not be able to find canons defining the very principle of hierarchy.
There is not a single rule calling for the Church to have all three orders of
clerics. The basic organization of a Christian community headed by a bishop is
not to be found. This is especially evident if one takes note that the canons
quite thoroughly determine the Metropolitan's administration. The same
incompleteness can be found with other canonical problems for example with
Ecclesiastical juridical process, as well as Sacraments of Baptism, Eucharist
and Matrimony. In textbooks of Canon Law these lacunae are completed by
teaching found in the New Testament and in the writings of the Fathers and
Teachers of the Church. The Apostolic Canons and the commandments of Christ
himself are given the characteristics of canonical norms although not a single
Council ruled which of these must be considered as such. We are so accustomed
to these gaps that they are not even noticed, but if some historian would
attempt to describe the organization of the Church based exclusively on
canonical norms he would fall into a number of serious errors. The same mistake
is made by those who attempt to base canonical consciousness exclusively on the
canons. This attempt is nothing more than an illusion. If canonical norms speak
of this or that fact or manifestation of Church life, it can be judged to be
correct based on these canonical norms. But, what can be said about something
which the canonical norms did not even anticipate? If only that is canonical
which corresponds to canons and what does not so correspond is uncanonical
then, as we have seen, there is no indication in the canons about the most
basic and fundamental areas of Church structures. Finally if all the canonical
legislation is taken as a whole as the basis of canonical consciousness then it
must be accepted that each local Church enjoys its own canonical consciousness.
This not only reduces the dimension of the sphere of canonical consciousness
but the possibility of any canonical assessment of any local Church disappears.
This concept does not allow for a solution of canonical problems applicable to
the whole Orthodox Church but does allow each Autocephalous Church to resolve
these problems only for itself. This would undermine the oneness of Orthodox
consciousness which unites all local Churches, even in the absence of mutual
juridical relations, into the One Apostolic Church. That separatism and that
isolation of local Churches which is presently quite evident, can be partly
explained by this defect in canonical consciousness.
If the absence of unity
and completeness of canonical norms is a hindrance for the acceptance of these
norms as the foundation of canonical consciousness then, on the other hand,
these features of canonical creativity should not be blamed on those
deficiencies. Canonical legislation never had the task to establish basic norms
and basic principles of Ecclesiastical organization. These were given once and
for all in the dogmatical teaching about the Church which not only anticipates
canonical creativity but becomes its basis and precondition. Canonical
creativity in the Church has the task to further that which would enable the
dogmatical teaching about the Church to find a more correct and complete
realization in the given historical condition of the Church's organization, and
to protect the Church's life from deviations and error. The content of the
dogmatical teaching about the Church determines the content of canonical
legislation. A different teaching about the Church would invariably result in
different canons since they make up the active force in the life of the Church.
Ecclesiastical decisions are in effect the canonical interpretations of the
dogma about the Church during a particular moment in the history of its
existence. The basic principles of the Church's teachings do not fall into the
area of canon law but are a part of dogmatics. This gives canonical norms a
special characteristic distinguishing them from juridical norms, and canon law
is given those characteristics which make of it a particularly unique law.
The attempts to
extrapolate canonical consciousness out of the existing historical forms of
Church life or out of the canons themselves are wrong in that they ignore the
foundations of Church life and accept it in an empirical and temporary aspect.
The foundation of correct canonical consciousness cannot be that which is
transient and temporary, that which depends upon the historical moment, but
that which in her is not transient and not temporary, which does not depend on
historical conditions and historical circumstances. This means that the
foundation of canonical consciousness can be found only in the dogmatical
teaching on the Church. Such a canonical consciousness is very close to
dogmatical consciousness and only differs from it in its direction and purpose.
It is the moving force of Church history which is intended to actualize the
complete expression of the dogmatic teaching at any given moment, in its
canonical expression. It remains without change among the changing forms of
Church life and is unique for all times, and inasmuch as the dogmatical
teaching remains changeless and unique it becomes universal for all Churches
since all Orthodox Churches confess a single dogmatical teaching. It alone has
the only correct and true criterion not only for the solution of individual
canonical problems but for an evaluation of canonical forms and for a judgment
of the character of the canons themselves.
* * *
Today the question on the character of canons, i.e. whether they are subject to change or whether they remain absolutely changeless, is of particular practical significance. This problem is not new and repeatedly came to the fore by life itself. The Council in Trullo resolved this on the side of the immutability of canons. On the other hand, canonical creativity was a fact throughout its existence and even decrees of Imperial authority in effect repealed purely Ecclesiastical enactments. How little the Imperial authority felt constrained can be seen in the opinions of jurists in the days of Manuel Comnenus, that his royal decrees superseded not only the Code of Justinian but collections of canons as well. It is true that these views did not find official endorsement and were completely forgotten with the fall of Byzantium, but the decision of the Trullan Council found broad acceptance. It is not uncommon today to find, if not in literature then in various Church circles, the conviction that equates the canons, as to their obligation and immutability, with dogmatic formulations. It is not really necessary to point out that such a view can be derived not only from theological misunderstanding but from ignorance. To insist upon the absolute immutability of canons is tantamount to the admission that not only our generation but preceding ones, have been excluded from the Church. It is sufficient to point to the ninth Apostolic Canon, which decrees the excommunication all laymen (as well as the eighth for clerics) who "do not remain for prayer and the Eucharist to the end." If all canons are immutable then they all are, and remain, in force. It is not likely that this view is agreeable to those who defend it. Furthermore, such a teaching does not take into account that state of ecclesiastical legislation described above.
The theological
misunderstanding consists in that this opinion does not take into account that
the absolutely immutable character of dogmas is not conditioned upon by their
being enacted by Councils and accepted by the Church, but because they are an
expression of absolute truth. Their formulation by Councils and their
acceptance by the Church are but the solemn witness of their truth. They
express not what is temporary but what is eternal, but incidentally, just as do
the canons, they have to do with the temporary forms of Church life, even
though these forms can be considered unchangeable within the limits of
empirical existence.
Canonical
scholarship cannot accept this point of view about the canons. On the one hand,
one can find both in the Orthodox but especially in the Catholic canonical
literature, another view which defines as immutable only those canons which are
based on Divine law. All those norms, which emanate from the clearly expressed
Divine will contained in Scripture and in Tradition have an immutable and an
absolute character, all other norms are related to the area of human law and
thus can be subject to change. Of course, the believer cannot knowingly
encroach upon the absolute character of Divine commandments but it appears that
the distinction between jus divinum and jus humanum is far from certain. In
practice most of the arguments are brought about by the question of the
character of that or another decree, is it attributable to Divine or to human
law. The norms affirmed in the Gospel are indisputable from this point of view,
but with respect to norms found in the Epistles, one cannot always be
categorical. The Apostle Paul in certain cases clearly indicates the source of
his rules, and in other cases there are no such clear indications. It is with
great difficulty that one discovers the teaching about the immutable character
of norms, based on Divine law in those cases when some of those norms have been
subject to change in the life of the Church. Even Christ's commandments, if they be given a canonical
meaning, assume a temporary character, i.e. they are considered obligatory for
certain epochs and not obligatory for others (e.g. those dealing with the
dissolution of marriage and the grounds for it). The Church structure of the
Corinthian community described by Apostle Paul has existed for a few decades.
Neither was the so-called Apostolic decretal -- the decision of the Jerusalem
Apostolic council considered of long duration. There is no need to give any
more such examples, since we have seen more than once how the absolutization of
the temporary leads to the relativization of the eternal.
Frequently there ate
strange points of approach of Orthodox teaching with Protestantism but these
really, are only points, beyond which begins a substantial diversion. The
principle of mutability of all canonical enactments in Protestantism flows out
of completely different beginnings than in Orthodoxy. With us, behind the
mutability of canons stands canonical consciousness or, in the end result, the
dogmatical teaching on the Church. Every canonical decree is related to the
exposition of an absolute truth which lies as the basis of canonical
consciousness. If this exposition can and even must be changed then the truth
which lies in the basis remains forever immutable. Different historical
periods, different spiritual development, can demand changes or revocation only
of that external cover of the truth, but they cannot change the truth itself.
Just as in the teaching about the structure of the Church and just on the
question of the mutability of canons, Protestantism overlooked this truth.
In that the canons can be
changed does not mean that they must be changed or that they can be changed by
the personal whim of every Church member or even of a whole Church community.
The canonical creativity of the Orthodox Church in its fullness,
notwithstanding this or that detail, is an experience of many years of the
Church's and of its consciousness, of its attempt towards the realization of
the teaching of the Church in different historical epochs. We only continue
that which was not started by us although we are somewhat inclined to think
that history begins only with us. Thus our activity always has a combination of
tradition and creativity, and tradition is the fulcrum for our creativity and a
guarantee that even our creativity will not end with us. None the less, all
human creativity is a manner of destruction of the past, that past which ceased
to be a creative tradition, and turned into inertia and stagnation interfering
with creativity. We can and must change Church decrees but only when they
ceased to be canons, when they can no longer carry our their purpose -- to
direct Church forms towards a more complete and a more better realization of
the teaching on the Church, i.e. when they cease to be those decrees through
which canonical consciousness can be expressed. There are times when canonical
truth is on the side of those who violate one or another of the canons, and not
on the side of those who comply with them and demand compliance. We must prove
the truthfulness of such a paradox from experience, and this paradox is
engendered from the conflict of canonical consciousness as the creative
principle and as the highest criterion and a canonical consciousness as a blind
and dead compliance with the letter of the law, a service to the letter, which
finds its expression in the canons. A deep and tragic conflict of two types of
canonical consciousness from which only one eternally comes forth as the
creative moment, and the other, the inert and fossilized form of Church life.
The designation of canons
as Ecclesiastical prescriptions is to promote -- positively or negatively --
that the Church life would more closely realize its dogmatical teaching. The
closer the ecclesiastical norms approach dogmatical teaching, the greater is
their approach towards the possession of immutability, but this immutability
does not lie in the canons but in the dogmatical teachings which they express.
Therefore we believe that certain canonical decrees of the Councils will
preserve their strength to the end of time and for us, they are sacred just as
are those dogmas which they express.
* * *
In the passage of time
canonical consciousness always remains one, always equal to itself. Through its
unity the various forms of Church life are not seen as separate moments in
history, but are tied together into one intact process, uniting the first point
of Church structure -- the charismatic structure -- with the foundation of our
ecclesiastical organization. It urges us to look not backwards but through the
present -- ahead, into the future. In the life of the Apostolic Church what was
beyond value was not the form of that life but that through this form the
Church life almost completely, as an exceptional image, realized the dogmatical
teaching on the Church. If we were to transpose this structure mechanically
into our life, we would accomplish the ideal of Church life that much less than
under the present conditions. We can only hope that our canonical consciousness
achieves that clarity which it had in Apostolic times. The more we manifest the
dogmatic truth in our Church life the closer we would approach the apostolic
times, although under our external structure we would move even farther from
it.
Canonical consciousness
demands from us a constant creativity of Church life, but not only creativity
but new forms if this becomes necessary, but a creative concern for older
forms, i.e. so they can become for us not a self-satisfying value, but really a
form through which the dogmatical teaching is realized. We must likewise
approach the canons with creativity. Should it happen that some ecclesiastical
decree no longer reflects its purpose, then we are obliged to reject it, since
not only is that which corresponds to canons canonical, but the canons
themselves may be "canonical" and not "canonical".
However it would be a
mistake to think that the canonical consciousness is of such magnitude that it
can be determined for any concrete situation. There are no such magnitudes in
the Orthodox Church, not only in the sphere of canons but in the area of dogma.
Temporary distortions and loss of direction are always possible. However, truth
was given to the Church and thus the truth always abides in her, even though we
may not be able to determine this formally. A different point of view would
indicate a lack of faith in the Church, an understanding of the Church as only
a human and not a Divine foundation. That which may not be possible in a formal
order is possible on the order of grace.
N. Afanasiev in Put' No.
39 (1933) Appendix
Translated by Fr. Alvian Smirensky
Source: http://www.holy-trinity.org/ecclesiology/afanasiev-canons.html
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